The Curious Case of Greening in Carbon Markets by Salzman, James & Boyd, William
GAL.BOYD&SALZMAN.DOC 3/10/2011 11:11 AM 
 
[73] 
THE CURIOUS CASE OF GREENING IN CARBON MARKETS 
BY 
WILLIAM BOYD* & JAMES SALZMAN** 
Over the last several years, so-called carbon markets have 
emerged around the world to facilitate trading in greenhouse gas 
credits. This Article takes a close look at an unexpected and 
unprecedented development in some of these markets—premium 
“green” currencies have emerged and, in some cases, displaced 
standard compliance currencies. Past experiences with other 
environmental compliance markets, such as the sulfur dioxide and 
wetlands mitigation markets, suggest the exact opposite should be 
occurring. Indeed, buyers in such markets should only be interested in 
buying compliance, not in the underlying environmental integrity of the 
compliance unit. In some of the compliance carbon markets, however, 
higher quality green credits have emerged in recent years as important 
currencies for a number of buyers, representing a dynamic that we 
refer to as “Gresham’s Law in reverse”—more stringent currencies 
arising alongside and even displacing inferior currencies. This Article 
provides the first recognition and analysis of green differentiation in 
carbon markets. We explore a range of explanations for this curious 
development. We then identify potential lessons for the design and 
evolution of future carbon markets and, more generally, environmental 
compliance markets. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, Hungary made news in the climate change world when it 
announced the sale of six million greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction credits to 
Spain, the largest sale in the world at that time.1 The fact that Hungary was 
selling emissions credits (known as Assigned Amount Units or AAUs) to 
Spain was not surprising, nor was its earlier sale of two million credits to 
Belgium.2 As members of the European Union (EU), Spain and Belgium have 
committed under the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto Protocol, Kyoto, or Protocol) to 
reducing their GHG emissions eight percent below 1990 levels by 2012,3 and 
this reduction can be met by a combination of both actual emissions 
reductions and the purchase of emission reduction credits. 
What was surprising was the sales strategy of Hungary. It proclaimed 
that its reduction credits were especially valuable because the funds raised 
by the sale would be invested in energy efficiency projects in residential and 
public sector buildings rather than simply going into the national treasury to 
be used on roads, pensions, or some other general need.4 Nor was Hungary’s 
strategy unique. Over the past three years, Ukraine, the Czech Republic, 
Latvia, Poland, and other eastern and central European countries have 
announced similar transactions.5 
These all have been described as so-called “Green Investment Scheme” 
(GIS) deals.6 GIS is a self-imposed commitment by potential seller countries 
 
 1 See Michael Szabo, Spain Buys 6 Million Emissions Rights from Hungary, REUTERS, Nov. 
13, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE4AC50420081113. 
 2 See id. 
 3 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
art. 3, ¶ 1, annex B, Dec. 10, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 214. 
 4 See Szabo, supra note 1. 
 5 Andreas Tuerk et al., Green Investment Schemes: First Experiences and Lessons Learned 
31 tbl.4 (Central European University Center for Climate Change and Sustainable Energy Policy 
and Joanneum Research, Working Paper, 2010) (reviewing GIS efforts in 11 central and eastern 
European countries). The largest transaction to date has been the Czech Republic’s 2009 sale of 
40 million AAUs to Japan. Id. 
 6 See WILLIAM BLYTH & RICHARD BARON, OECD ENV’T DIRECTORATE & INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, 
GREEN INVESTMENT SCHEMES: OPTIONS AND ISSUES 7 (2003) (“The purpose of Green Investment 
Schemes (GIS) is to promote the environmental efficacy of transfers of excess AAUs, by 
earmarking revenues from these transfers for environmentally-related purposes in the seller 
countries. This should act to improve the marketability of AAUs from some seller countries.” 
(citation omitted)); ALEXEY KOKORIN, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
KNOWLEDGE NETWORK, GREEN INVESTMENT SCHEMES AS A WAY OF PROMOTING ENVIRONMENTALLY-
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that the income generated from sale of their credits will go to environmental 
projects.7 There has been a comparable development in the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) market, where an increasing number of 
certified emissions reductions (CERs) are held out as meeting a “Gold 
Standard” of exceptional environmental quality.8 
It is important to note that these markets for “green” AAUs and CERs 
are not mandated by the Kyoto Protocol. Nascent and still developing, they 
are entirely voluntary creations with no regulatory oversight. The problem is 
that this shouldn’t be happening, not if past experience with other 
environmental compliance markets is any guide. 
Differential “greening” would be perfectly understandable in the 
development of voluntary markets such as organic produce or paper with 
recycled content. Here, green consumers are explicitly buying 
environmental integrity but have difficulty choosing among competing 
products.9 To meet this need, information intermediaries such as standards 
and certification bodies or rating agencies emerge to resolve questions of 
trust and quality and to fill gaps due to lack of regulatory oversight.10 Put 
simply, these bodies ensure that buyers know what they are getting when 
faced with a range of purchasing options. 
But regulatory markets, such as those created by the Kyoto Protocol, are 
very different from those for organic produce or recycled paper. These are 
entirely artificial markets created by law with one product for sale—
compliance credits. Belgium and Spain surely are not green consumers. As 
rational economic actors, they and other buyers in these markets should simply 
be concerned about the cost of compliance—whether they have enough 
emissions reduction credits to meet their Kyoto obligations at low cost. This 
has certainly been the case in other environmental compliance markets. 
Classic pollution reduction markets, such as the Clean Air Act’s11 sulfur 
dioxide (SO2)
12 and chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) markets,13 and resource 
allocation markets, such as individual transferable quota schemes in 
 
SOUND COOPERATION AMONG RUSSIA, CANADA, JAPAN AND OTHER NATIONS UNDER THE KYOTO 
PROTOCOL 2 (2003). 
 7 See BLYTH & BARON, supra note 6, at 7; KOKORIN, supra note 6, at 2. 
 8 See Press Release, Gold Standard Foundation, Introducing the Gold Standard, 
available at http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/fileadmin/editors/files/1_communication/handout/
GS_in_brief.pdf; see also Kelly Levin et al., Can Non-State Certification Systems Bolster State-
Centered Efforts to Promote Sustainable Development Through the Clean Development 
Mechanism?, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 777, 783–88 (2009) (describing the Gold Standard and its 
relationship to the CDM). 
 9 See generally Jeffrey J. Minneti, Relational Integrity Regulation: Nudging Consumers 
Towards Products Bearing Valid Environmental Marketing Claims, 40 ENVTL L. 1327 (2010) 
(discussing eco-labeling and environmental marketing regulation). 
 10 Id. at 1366. 
 11 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006). 
 12 See id. § 7651b (establishing SOX allowance trading program). 
 13 See id. § 7671f (establishing allowance trading program for class I and class II ozone 
depleting substances). Chlorofluorocarbons are class I ozone depleting substances. Id. § 7671a. 
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fisheries,14 have not tended toward any sort of greening or voluntary 
differentiation. Nor have offset markets such as wetlands mitigation banking 
or species banking, even though issues of quality and fungibility are 
notoriously problematic in these markets.15 In all of these environmental 
markets and many more, the trading currency has remained unchanged and 
unchallenged—whether a kilogram of fish or a ton of pollutant. Unlike 
apples or oranges, there has been one and only one purchasing option. How 
sustainably the fish was caught or emission reduction achieved has been 
irrelevant and will likely remain so. Regulated parties want compliance or 
access to the resource at lowest cost, period. Yet this is not happening in the 
Kyoto markets. Something else is going on. 
To understand carbon markets, then, we need to understand why green 
differentiation is happening when least expected. Why is Gresham’s Law16 
occurring in reverse—superior currencies emerging alongside and, in some 
cases, driving out cheaper currencies? Explaining this development requires 
that we examine the role of governments as market participants and 
understand the political economy driving government decision-making in 
these markets. 
Our central thesis is that carbon markets operate quite differently when 
governments are major players. This raises obvious questions about market 
design, whether one might expect to see similar greening dynamics in 
markets involving private actors, and the evolution of future carbon 
markets. Indeed, contrary to Gresham’s Law, it seems quite likely that the 
premium “green” currencies currently emerging in the Kyoto compliance 
markets will lead to tighter rules and higher compliance standards for future 
carbon markets at international, regional, and national levels. 
Part II provides a general overview of the carbon markets, highlighting 
the differences between the voluntary carbon markets and the compliance 
carbon markets. Part III discusses the most important environmental 
integrity concerns that have arisen in compliance carbon markets, in 
particular the so-called “hot air” problem from over-allocation of emissions 
allowances under the Kyoto Protocol and lack of additionality associated 
with certain CDM projects. Part IV considers the lessons from other 
environmental compliance markets, demonstrating the lack of any green 
differentiation in these markets. Part V contrasts these experiences with the 
 
 14 COLIN W. CLARK, THE WORLDWIDE CRISIS IN FISHERIES: ECONOMIC MODELS AND HUMAN 
BEHAVIOR 23 (2006). 
 15 See Deborah Fleischer & Jessica Fox, The Pitfalls and Challenges, in CONSERVATION & 
BIODIVERSITY BANKING: A GUIDE TO SETTING UP AND RUNNING BIODIVERSITY CREDIT TRADING 
SYSTEMS 43, 43–44 (Ricardo Bayon et al. eds., 2008); Dustin J. Edwards, Wetland Mitigation 
Banking: Is the Current System Beyond Repair?, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 445, 457–59 (2003) 
(discussing wetlands mitigation). 
 16 Gresham’s Law holds that under certain circumstances “bad money” will drive “good 
money” out of circulation. See generally Frank Whitson Fetter, Some Neglected Aspects of 
Gresham’s Law, 46 Q. J. ECON. 480 (1932) (providing overview of development and application 
of Gresham’s Law); James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of 
Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 637, 665 (2000) (discussing Gresham’s Law in context 
of environmental trading markets). 
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evolution of greened carbon credits in the Kyoto markets. Part VI offers a 
range of explanations for these developments and Part VII explores lessons 
this experience offers for the future of carbon markets. 
II. CARBON MARKETS 101 
The theory of emissions trading rests on the premise that reduction and 
sequestration of GHGs across different sectors, activities, and geographies 
can be made fungible and therefore amenable to trading.17 Because GHG 
emissions are global and well-mixed in the atmosphere, it should not matter 
from an atmospheric standpoint where the reductions (or sequestrations) 
occur.18 Put more crudely, under the standard economic approach to GHG 
emissions trading, a “ton is a ton is a ton” regardless of whether it comes 
from a reforestation project in Tanzania, an industrial gas destruction 
project in China, or reductions at a coal-fired utility in Germany.19 In theory, 
this fungibility enables “where and when flexibility” with respect to GHG 
emissions reductions and sequestration activities, thereby allowing 
mitigation efforts to proceed in the context of a robust market instrument at 
the lowest marginal cost.20 This premise provides the foundation for the so-
called carbon markets,21 which are designed to allow trading of emissions 
reduction and sequestration credits from various activities in various 
 
 17 See LAWRENCE H. GOULDER & WILLIAM A. PIZER, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, THE ECONOMICS OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE 7–9 (2006) (discussing emissions trading and other policy instruments for 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions). 
 18 Id. at 11. 
 19 While emissions trading rests on the premise that all reductions or sequestrations can be 
made fungible, the emergence of green differentiation in carbon markets illustrates the 
difficulties of ensuring commensurability. See infra Part V; see also William Boyd, Ways of 
Seeing in Environmental Law: How Deforestation Became an Object of Climate Governance, 37 
ECOLOGY L. Q. 843, 891–98, 911–15 (2010) (discussing challenges of commensurability in 
translating forest carbon into compliance carbon and general problem of equivalence in 
environmental law); Donald MacKenzie, Making Things the Same: Gases, Emission Rights and 
the Politics of Carbon Markets, 34 ACCT., ORGS. & SOC’Y 440, 440 (2009) (analyzing how 
commensurability is established between emissions reductions activities and the role of such 
commensurability in providing “conditions of possibility” for emerging carbon markets); Michel 
Callon, Civilizing Markets: Carbon Trading Between in vitro and in vivo Experiments, 34 ACCT., 
ORGS. & SOC’Y 535, 540 (2009) (discussing the establishment and stabilization of “equivalences” 
between different greenhouse gases as a critical prerequisite for economic valuation and the 
functioning of carbon markets); Peter Levin & Wendy Nelson Espeland, Pollution Futures: 
Commensuration, Commodification, and the Market for Air, in ORGANIZATIONS, POLICY, AND THE 
NATURAL ENVIRONMENT: INSTITUTIONAL AND STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES (Andrew J. Hoffman & 
Marc J. Ventresca eds., 2002) (examining the role of “commensuration” in creating tradable 
pollution permits and sustaining market-based approaches to air pollution control); Salzman & 
Ruhl, supra note 16, at 609–15 (discussing challenges of establishing fungibility in 
environmental markets). 
 20 Note the related issue of temporal (“when”) flexibility of emissions reductions given 
the long residence times of carbon dioxide (CO2)  and other GHGs in the atmosphere. See 
GOULDER & PIZER, supra note 17, at 11 (discussing “where” and “when” flexibility associated 
with GHG emissions trading systems). 
 21 We use the phrase “carbon markets” as shorthand for GHG markets. 
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places as a means of ensuring that overall reductions occur at the lowest 
possible cost.22 
Based on this foundation, today’s carbon markets come in two main 
flavors: voluntary and compliance. In the voluntary markets, buyers and 
sellers trade carbon offsets of various types for the purpose of offsetting the 
emissions associated with a particular activity. Many, but not all, of the 
buyers of voluntary offsets are interested primarily in the reputational 
benefits that come from offsetting a portion of their emissions, and thus 
want some assurance that the purchased offsets have environmental 
integrity.23 But because of the high information costs of establishing such 
integrity on a case-by-case basis, multiple information intermediaries have 
emerged in the form of standards bodies for the purpose of ensuring the 
credibility of offsets sold in the voluntary markets, including, for example, 
the Voluntary Carbon Standard,24 the Climate Action Reserve,25 and the 
Chicago Climate Exchange.26 Some of these standards maintain their own 
registries and issue their own units. Several have developed extensive 
rulebooks, protocols, and methodologies for project accounting, reporting, 
and verification.27 Outside of basic consumer protection laws, there is very 
little regulation of the voluntary carbon markets. Some have described these 
markets as a wild west, buyer-beware environment.28 
The size of the voluntary carbon markets, in value and volume, has 
grown significantly over the last decade, but is still quite small when 
compared to the compliance markets. In 2009, total market volume was 
around 87 million tons and total value was around $388 million.29 
 
 22 Obviously, designing and operationalizing such a market is quite challenging, particularly 
as the number of GHGs, sectors, and activities included within the market increase. This Article 
does not address these broader market design challenges. 
 23 INT’L ENERGY AGENCY GREENHOUSE GAS RESEARCH & DEV. PROGRAMME, VOLUNTARY 
CARBON OFFSETS 17 (2008), available at http://www.ieaghg.org/docs/general_publications/ 
Carbon%20Offsetsweb.pdf. Some buyers are also likely interested in gaining experience in the 
carbon markets as they prepare for emerging compliance markets. Id. 
 24 See Voluntary Carbon Standard, About the VCS, http://www.v-c-s.org/about.html (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2011). 
 25 See Climate Action Reserve, Program, http://www.climateactionreserve.org/how/ 
program/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2011). 
 26 See Chicago Climate Exchange, Climate Change Exchange, http://www.chicagoclimatex 
.com/index.jsf (last visited Feb. 13, 2011). 
 27 See ANJA KOLLMUSS ET AL., HANDBOOK OF CARBON OFFSET PROGRAMS: TRADING SYSTEMS, 
FUNDS, PROTOCOLS AND STANDARDS 5–6 (2010) (providing overview of various voluntary 
offset standards). 
 28 E.g., JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34241, VOLUNTARY CARBON 
OFFSETS: OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT 11 (2009); Neal Dikeman, EcoSecurities Founder Says 
Carbon Markets Work, GREEN TECH BLOG (May 19, 2008, 11:53 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-
11128_3-9947454-54.html. 
 29 This figure includes both project-based voluntary market transactions and transactions 
under the Chicago Climate Exchange, which functions more like an allowance market. 
ALEXANDRE KOSSOY & PHILIPPE AMBROSI, WORLD BANK, STATE AND TRENDS OF THE CARBON 
MARKET 2010 at 1 tbl.1 (2010). 
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The compliance markets, in contrast, are much larger (about $143 
billion in 2009) and operate at multiple levels.30 At the “global” level, the 
Kyoto Protocol flexibility mechanisms—emissions trading, Joint 
Implementation (JI), and the CDM—constitute a Kyoto compliance market, 
where specific Kyoto units (AAUs, CERs, emission reduction unit (ERUs), 
and removal units (RMUs)) are traded and ultimately used by the Annex B 
parties to demonstrate compliance with their Kyoto reduction targets.31 
Within the Kyoto compliance market, there is an important distinction 
between trading of emissions allowances (AAUs issued to the parties based on 
their initial “assigned amounts”) and project-based offset credits (CERs or 
ERUs issued under the CDM or JI) that can be used for compliance purposes.32 
Underneath the Kyoto market, there are regional and national 
compliance markets that operate primarily as mechanisms intended to help 
certain Kyoto parties meet their Kyoto obligations. The largest of these is the 
EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) (2009 value of about $118 billion), 
which provides the primary Kyoto compliance mechanism for the EU 
Member States.33 The EU ETS began operations in 2005, with a first trial 
phase running through 2007.34 Phase II matches the first Kyoto commitment 
period (2008–2012), and the EU has committed to a Phase III (2013–2020) 
 
 30 Id. 
 31 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
supra note 3, art. 17 (establishing emissions trading mechanism), art. 6 (establishing joint 
implementation mechanism), art. 12 (establishing CDM mechanism); see also U.N. FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, KYOTO PROTOCOL REFERENCE MANUAL ON ACCOUNTING OF 
EMISSIONS AND ASSIGNED AMOUNT 11, 15–18 (2008), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/ 
publications/08_unfccc_kp_ref_manual.pdf [hereinafter KYOTO REFERENCE MANUAL] (describing 
different flexible mechanisms and various Kyoto units used under the different mechanisms). 
 32 See KYOTO REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 31, at 13–14, 17 (noting that under Kyoto each 
Annex B Party is assigned a total emissions target relative to its 1990 baseline, and that the 
quantity of the initially assigned amount is broken into AAUs, each of which represents an 
allowance to emit one metric tonne of CO2 equivalent (tCO2e)). By permitting trading of AAUs 
among the Annex B Parties, the Kyoto Protocol allows these Parties to choose between making 
emissions reductions at home or buying allowances to cover part of their compliance 
obligations. In addition to AAU emissions trading, the Protocol’s JI mechanism allows an Annex 
B Party to invest in an emissions reduction or sequestration projects in other Annex B Parties 
and receive credits—ERUs—that can then be used to meet the buyer’s Kyoto compliance 
obligation. Id. Under the CDM mechanism, an Annex B Party can buy compliance credits—
CERs—from projects in non-Annex B Parties. Id.  
 33 See KOSSOY & AMBROSI, supra note 29, at 5 (providing data on size of the EU ETS relative 
to other carbon markets); David M. Driesen, Linkage and Multilevel Governance, 19 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 389, 392 (2009) (noting that the EU chose to use emission trading as the main 
mechanism for complying with the Kyoto Protocol). 
 34 See Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 
2003 Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Within the 
Community and Amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, arts. 10, 11(1), 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32, 36; 
see also A. DENNY ELLERMAN & PAUL L. JOSKOW, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, THE 
EUROPEAN UNION’S EMISSION TRADING SYSTEM IN PERSPECTIVE iii (2008), available at 
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/EU-ETS-In-Perspective-Report.pdf (noting that the EU 
ETS began in 2005 with a trial phase that ran through 2007). 
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regardless of what happens in the international climate negotiations.35 In 
contrast to Kyoto, which applies to governments, the EU ETS covers private 
sector entities (more than ten thousand installations in major energy and 
industrial sectors across the twenty-seven participating jurisdictions).36 
These covered entities are allowed to tender three units for compliance 
purposes: emissions allowances (EUAs) and certain types of CERs and 
ERUs issued under the CDM and JI Kyoto mechanisms.37 
Outside of Kyoto, there are several other existing and emerging 
compliance markets at the subnational level. The Australian state of New 
South Wales and the Canadian province of Alberta both operate their own 
provincial-level compliance systems.38 In the United States, the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), which went live in 2009, operates a cap-
and-trade system for carbon dioxide (CO2) in the power sector in ten mid-
Atlantic and Northeastern states, and allows for the trading of emissions 
allowances and offsets subject to its own particular rules.39 California is 
moving toward the adoption of a cap-and-trade system that would start in 
2012, and is also exploring ways to link its system with those in several other 
western states and Canadian provinces through the Western Climate 
Initiative (WCI).40 All of these emerging compliance markets are developing 
their own rules, while exploring various possibilities for linkage with other 
existing and emerging markets.41 Given the differences between these 
systems, however, it is unclear whether and how they will link to other 
 
 35 See Questions & Answers on the Revised EU Emissions Trading System (Dec. 17, 
2008), available at http://www.travellingeuets.com/@api/deki/files/78/=Memo_08-796_REVISED 
_-_clean.pdf (providing overview of EU ETS and revisions for the Phase III period (post-2012)) 
[hereinafter European Comm’n Memorandum]; see also ELLERMAN & JOSKOW, supra note 35, at 1 
(noting that the EU ETS is expected to endure independent from any existing or future 
international climate agreements). 
 36 European Comm’n Memorandum, supra note 35. 
 37 Id. CERs and ERUs are only allowed for certain activities, pursuant to the so-called 
linking directive. See Directive 2004/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
27 October 2004 Amending Directive 2003/87/EC Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Allowance Trading Within the Community, in Respect of the Kyoto Protocol’s Project 
Mechanisms, 2004 O.J. (L 338) 18–21. 
 38 See Government of Alberta, Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program – Albert Environment, 
http://environment.alberta.ca/01838.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2010); NEW SOUTH WALES 
GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION SCHEME, INTRODUCTION TO THE GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION 
SCHEME (GGAS) (2010), available at http://greenhousegas.nsw.gov.au/documents/Intro-GGAS.pdf. 
 39 See REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, OVERVIEW OF RGGI CO2 BUDGET TRADING 
PROGRAM (2010), available at http://rggi.org/docs/program_summary_10_07.pdf; Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Welcome, http://rggi.org/home (last visited Oct. 30, 2010) (identifying 
the ten northeastern and mid-Atlantic states participating in RGGI). 
 40 See Assemb. B. 32, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006); CAL. AIR RES. BD., CLIMATE CHANGE 
SCOPING PLAN: A FRAMEWORK FOR CHANGE at ES-1 (2008); CAL. AIR RES. BD., PROPOSED 
REGULATION TO IMPLEMENT THE CALIFORNIA CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM, Appendix A: Proposed 
Regulation Order (Oct. 28, 2010); WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, DESIGN FOR THE WCI REGIONAL 
PROGRAM at 1–2, DD-2 (2010). 
 41 See Judson Jaffe et al., Linking Tradable Permit Systems: A Key Element of Emerging 
International Climate Policy Architecture, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 789, 790–91 (2009) (discussing 
various linkage options).  
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Kyoto compliance markets, such as the EU ETS, and to flexibility 
mechanisms, such as the CDM. 
In sum, the compliance carbon markets are quite fragmented with a 
range of different sellers, buyers, units, and rules. Given the lack of progress 
toward a post-2012 international agreement, such fragmentation will likely 
continue for some time. In all of these compliance markets, however, the 
buyers of compliance units are interested primarily in satisfying their 
regulatory obligations. They are interested, in other words, in buying 
compliance—or so one would think. 
III. PROBLEMS IN THE CARBON MARKETS—HOT AIR AND  
ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY 
The overarching policy concern regarding a compliance carbon market 
is whether it will function in a manner that actually reduces emissions. In 
the Kyoto context, this concern has been apparent from the very beginning, 
and has led to more than a few calls for abandoning the whole effort.42 Two 
issues in particular have dominated the discussions surrounding Kyoto’s 
environmental performance. First, there has been a long-standing concern 
since the late 1990s that the 1990 Kyoto baseline43 would result in substantial 
AAUs going to the former economies in transition, who would then sell them 
to other Annex B countries such as Japan or certain EU member states, 
allowing these countries to cover their compliance obligations with surplus 
AAUs rather than through actual emissions reductions.44 “Hot air” was the 
term coined by environmental groups such as the World Wildlife Fund, 
Greenpeace, and Friends of the Earth shortly after Kyoto was adopted in 
order to bring attention to this supposed “loophole” under the Protocol.45 
The environmental community thus saw this as a major defect of Kyoto, and 
 
 42 See Sergio Abranches, Why We Should Abandon the Kyoto Protocol and Aim Higher, 
http://www.ecopolity.com/2009/10/09/why-we-should-abandon-the-kyoto-protocol-and-aim-higher/ 
(last visited Nov. 18, 2010); SCOTT BARRETT, CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS RECONSIDERED 2-3 
(2008) available at http://www.policy-network.net/uploadedFiles/Publications/Publications/ 
Scott_Barrett.pdf; Christina K. Harper, Climate Change and Tax Policy, 30 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 411, 411 (2007). 
 43 The Kyoto Protocol allows Annex I Parties “undergoing the process of transition to a 
market economy” to choose a baseline other than 1990. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 3, art. 3, ¶ 5. Annex I Parties with a base 
year other than 1990 are Bulgaria (1988), Hungary (average of 1985–1987), Poland (1988), 
Romania (1989), Slovenia (1986). U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Geneva, 
Switz., July 8–19, 1996, Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at Its Second Session, 
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.1 (Oct. 29, 1996). 
 44 In other words, setting the baseline for emissions reductions at 1990 meant that the 
Soviet Union and its Eastern and Central European allies were effectively given a subsidy for 
joining the treaty because their economies collapsed after that date and produced fewer 
emissions than their AAU allocations. See David G. Victor et al., The Kyoto Protocol Emission 
Allocations: Windfall Surpluses for Russia and Ukraine, 49 CLIMATIC CHANGE 263, 263 (2001). 
 45 See Kokorin, supra note 6, at 2. The problem only got worse when it became clear that 
the United States, the largest potential source of demand for Kyoto units of any type, was never 
going to ratify the Protocol. Id. 
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mounted a campaign to limit the use of such hot air during the first 
commitment period.46 Several nations responded to these concerns with 
public commitments that they would not use hot air to meet their Kyoto 
compliance obligations.47 
The second major concern regarding Kyoto’s environmental 
performance has been the failure of the CDM program to drive investment to 
projects that satisfy basic additionality requirements (i.e., achieving 
reductions that are additional to what would happen under the business as 
usual scenario) and promote sustainable development.48 The CDM has thus 
had its own version of the hot air problem. This has been most apparent in 
the context of large industrial gas destruction projects.49 Because of the large 
global warming potential (GWP) of certain industrial gases such as 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs),50 much of the early investment in CDM focused 
on projects intended to destroy such gases. Indeed, the majority of CERs 
that have been issued to date have gone to these projects. By the end of 
2009, HFC destruction projects, most of which have been in China, 
accounted for about fifty percent of the total supply of issued CERs.51 
Evidence suggests that many of these projects were not additional; that 
is, these were existing projects that were simply relabeled as CDM projects 
 
 46 See Michele Betsill, Environmental NGOs Meet the Sovereign State: The Kyoto Protocol 
Negotiations on Global Climate Change, 13 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 49, 57 (2002). 
 47 See, e.g., Jeremy van Loon, Canada Won’t Buy Carbon Credits to Meet Kyoto Treaty 
Targets, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 10, 2008, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
newsarchive&sid=aK_E4068FTC4. 
 48 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
supra note 3, art. 12 (establishing the CDM, which requires the promotion of sustainable 
development). But the CDM Executive Board has not developed any sort of formal requirement 
that particular projects deliver sustainability benefits. See U.N. ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, A 
REFORMED CDM – INCLUDING NEW MECHANISMS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 47–48 (Karen 
Holm Olsen & Jorgen Fenhann eds., 2008).  
 49 A number of commentators have raised concerns about the “additionality” and lack of 
sustainable development benefits associated with these industrial gas destruction projects. See, 
e.g., Michael Wara, Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism’s Performance and Potential, 
55 UCLA L. REV. 1759, 1778, 1795 (2008).  
 50 HFC-23 has a GWP of 11,700, which means that the warming potential of 1 ton of HFC-23 
is equivalent to that from 11,700 tons of CO2. CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IPCC SCIENTIFIC 
ASSESSMENT: WORKING GROUP I CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIRST ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Technical Summary 22, tbl.4 (J.T. Houghton, 
G.J. Jenkins & J.J. Ephraums eds., 1990) (providing GWPs for various greenhouse gases 
including HFC-23). Thus, an HFC-23 gas destruction project under the CDM that destroys 100 
tons of HFC-23 could generate up to 1,170,000 tons of reductions or 1.17 million CERs. The 
GWP concept itself is not without problems, but has come to provide a key component of the 
technical foundation for the Kyoto Protocol’s embrace of a multi-gas compliance system. See, 
e.g., Keith P. Shine, The Global Warming Potential: The Need for an Interdisciplinary Retrial, 96 
CLIMATIC CHANGE 467, 467 (2009) (discussing problems of using GWPs as a basis for comparing 
the climate impacts of different GHGs).  
 51 See Andrew Allan, EU Signals HFC 23 CER Ban: Report, POINT CARBON, Oct. 26, 2010, 
available at http://www.pointcarbon.com/news/1.1482070. 
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in order to take advantage of carbon finance.52 Such projects have also been 
heavily criticized because of the “windfall” profits they generated for certain 
project developers and host country governments as well as their very 
limited contribution to sustainable development.53 In both the AAU and the 
CER markets, significant and very legitimate concerns have been raised that 
excess AAUs and low-quality CERs will flood the Kyoto markets and thus 
undermine the environmental integrity of the whole effort. 
IV. LESSONS FROM OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETS 
There are two basic types of regulatory environmental markets: cap-
and-trade markets and offset markets. In cap-and-trade markets, property 
rights are created in the form of use, emission, or extraction rights—for 
example, the right to graze in a certain area,54 emit a ton of sulfer oxides 
(SOX ) ,
55 or catch a lobster.56 These trading systems use the market to make 
prescriptive regulation more efficient. The government decides how much of 
a harmful activity to permit (such as pollution or fishery catch), awards 
private rights to engage in the activity up to the regulatory cap, and then 
permits those rights to be traded. The market does not play a role in 
determining the level of environmental protection; that is the role of the 
regulatory regime. 
If the cap is set appropriately, marketable permits should, in theory, 
achieve the same level of protection as command-and-control alternatives at 
a lower cost.57 The net result allows the regulated community to select 
appropriate control strategies and encourages innovative practices and 
technologies. In all of the cap-and-trade programs with which we are 
familiar—including the Clean Air Act’s SOX,
58 CFC,59 lead,60 nitrogen oxides 
 
 52 See, e.g., Wara supra note 49, at 1787 (“[C]ircumstantial evidence suggests that, rather than 
building new plants, HCFC-22 manufacturers elected to add capacity at existing plants during the 
CDM baseline period in order to take advantage of the CDM subsidy.” (footnote omitted)). 
 53 Id. at 1788–89. 
 54 See Benjamin M. Gramig, Greenhouse Gas Emissions Offsets from Agriculture: 
Opportunities and Challenges, in NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY COUNCIL REPORT 21: 
ADAPTING AGRICULTURE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 179, 181–82 (Allan Eaglesham & Ralph W.F. 
Hardy eds., 2010), available at http://nabc.cals.cornell.edu/pubs/nabc_21/NABC21_Module4_ 
Gramig.pdf. 
 55 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, SO2 Reductions and Allowance Trading Under the Acid Rain 
Program, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progsregs/arp/s02.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2011). 
 56 Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 16, at 607, 616. 
 57 Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Comment, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 
STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1333, 1341–42 (1985). See generally Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad, 
Prescriptive Environmental Regulations Versus Market-Based Incentives, in MOVING TO 
MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LESSONS FROM TWENTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE 3, 3–15 
(Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad eds., 2007) (reviewing lessons from experiences with 
environmental compliance markets); Ackerman & Stewart, supra, at 1341–47 (discussing merits 
of emissions trading relative to command-and-control regulation). 
 58 42 U.S.C. § 7651b (2006). 
 59 Id. § 7671f. 
 60 See OFFICE OF POL’Y, ECON., AND INNOVATION, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE UNITED 
STATES EXPERIENCE WITH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 86–87 
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(NOX),
61 and proposed Clean Air Interstate Rule62 trading schemes; individual 
transferable quotas for fisheries; and grazing rights—there has been no 
differentiation within the currency of trade. In other words, in none of these 
markets has a buyer expressed a preference for a “greener” subgroup of the 
commodity. To coal-fired utilities, a credit for a ton of reduced SOX is all that 
is needed. So long as the credit satisfies the regulatory compliance 
requirement, all’s well. Whether the credits came from “clean” or “dirty” 
operations, sustainable or unsustainable, is immaterial. 
The same is true for offset markets. In these markets, trades take place 
in the context of permitting exactions and mitigation conditions. The 
government authority conditions the granting of a permit to develop or 
destroy habitat on agreement by the party to provide some environmental 
value in return, such as open space or preserved habitat. Wetlands 
mitigation banking and endangered species banking are the best-known 
examples of these types of markets. In wetlands mitigation markets, the 
effective trade is habitat destroyed in exchange for other habitat conserved, 
generally larger in size.63 The permittee is responsible for finding the other 
conserved habitat purchased either on the open real estate market or from a 
so-called mitigation “bank,” which has conserved habitat for the express 
purpose of selling it to persons in need of such mitigation values.64 In either 
case, destroyed habitat is swapped for conserved habitat often with the 
person seeking the permit largely in control of which lands are traded.65 
As with cap-and-trade, there has been no market differentiation in 
offset markets. Buyers simply want to satisfy their regulatory requirements. 
They have no concern for the quality of the credits so long as the mitigation 
banks are certified. They have little or no interest in the specifics of how the 
credits have been generated. Indeed, this lack of concern over the quality of 
mitigation credits so long as they satisfy compliance requirements has led to 
real problems. The early history of wetlands banking was rife with failed 
mitigation projects.66 The wetlands vegetation planted prior to official 
inspection may have looked good enough for release of credits and issuance 
of the 404 permit,67 but the lack of subsequent oversight failed to uncover 
 
(2001), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwAN/EE-0216B-13.pdf/$file/EE-
0216B-13.pdf. 
 61 NOX Budget Trading Program for State Implementation Plans, 40 C.F.R. pt. 96 (2010). 
 62 Federal Implementation Plans to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter 
and Ozone, 75 Fed. Reg. 45,210 (proposed Aug. 2, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 
72, 78, and 97). 
 63 See MARK LANDRY ET AL., APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED FROM WETLANDS MITIGATION 
BANKING TO WATER QUALITY TRADING 4–5, 7 (2005), available at http://www.eli.org/pdf/wqtforum/ 
LanSiemStedShab05.pdf. 
 64 See Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 33 C.F.R. § 332.2 (2009); 
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Mitigation Banking Factsheet, http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/ 
facts/fact16.html (last visited Feb. 13. 2011).  
 65 See 33 C.F.R. § 332.2 (2009). 
 66 E.g., Roy R. Lewis, Why Florida Needs Mitigation Banking, 14 NAT’L WETLANDS NEWSL., 
Jan.–Feb. 1992, at 7. 
 67 Section 404 permits are issued by the Secretary of the Army if, after public notice and 
comment, the Secretary determines that the dredged or fill material will only cause a “minimal 
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that such “cosmetic mitigation” projects failed more often than they 
succeeded.68 In a compliance mitigation market, the supervising government 
authority is the only party that actually cares about quality, and it must 
carefully oversee transactions or poor quality mitigation will follow. 
A further type of environmental market exists within the larger 
voluntary marketplace. These markets are driven by environmentally 
concerned consumers. For example, consumer concern over ozone 
depletion led progressive aerosol producers in the late 1970s to identify 
some of their products with “CFC-free” labels, well before any government 
regulation for these compounds.69 In the produce market well into the 1990s, 
a plethora of “organic” labels bedeviled consumers who sought vegetables 
grown without pesticides or milk from cows who had not been given 
hormones.70 The labels, however, did not disclose the specific standards for 
certification.71 One of the best-known problems with such loose “eco-labels” 
was General Motors’ bold marketing claim for its sport utility vehicle as 
“environmentally friendly” because it had a CFC-free air conditioner.72 
In such a setting, a predictable pattern emerged. Amidst the noise of 
multiple labels and standards, confused consumers turned to trusted 
information intermediaries. Consumer Reports has served this role for many 
types of products,73 and a number of intermediaries have emerged to provide 
information on the green credentials of various types of products and their 
supply chains.74 Eventually, the government steps in—hence the guidelines 
for environmental marketing promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission 
or the federal Organic standard developed by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture after a record number of public comments.75  
 
adverse environmental effect.” Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006). 
Alternatively, a State can issue 404 permits if it has an authorized program. Id. § 1344(g). 
 68 James Salzman & J. B. Ruhl, “No Net Loss”: Instrument Choice in Wetlands Protection, in 
MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, supra note 57, at 323, 326.  
 69 See Rodney Dobell et al., Implementation in the Management of Global Environmental 
Risks, in 2 LEARNING TO MANAGE ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS 115, 124–26 (The Social Learning 
Group ed., 2001) (describing the development of consumer concerns over CFCs and 
subsequent legislation). 
 70 See generally National Organic Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,548, 80,663–65 (Dec. 21, 2000) 
(codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 205) (describing the growth in the organic market, the patchwork of 
private and state certification standards that developed prior to the promulgation of national 
rules, and the difficulty consumers had verifying “organic” label claims). 
 71 See generally id. at 80,664 (identifying variation in certification standards and state 
labeling requirements). 
 72 See generally Greenpeace, Gas-Friendly to Gas-Free? GM’s Attempt to Greenwash Its 
Image, http://stopgreenwash.org/casestudy_gm (last visited Feb. 13. 2011) (describing General 
Motors’ advertisements of its Chevrolet line of vehicles in 2007 focusing on the company’s 
efforts to be more environmentally friendly, such as through increasing vehicle fuel efficiency). 
 73 Consumer Reports, Our Mission, http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/aboutus/mission/ 
overview/index.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2011). 
 74 See, e.g., Good Guide, Good Guide, http//:www.goodguide.com (last visited Feb. 13, 
2011); see also Minneti, supra note 9, at 48; James Salzman, Sustainable Consumption and the 
Law, 27 ENVTL. L. 1243, 1263–65 (1997). 
 75 Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, 7 U.S.C. § 6503 (2006). 
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V. GREEN DIFFERENTIATION IN THE KYOTO MARKETS  
Given the environmental market experiences described in Part IV, we 
would expect to see something similar in the carbon markets—that is, no 
green differentiation among compliance credits. Indeed, the wetlands 
experience suggests we might expect to see evidence of Gresham’s Law, 
where the cheapest (and simplest) currency tends to dominate as the 
medium for exchange.76 
In the voluntary carbon markets, by contrast, where buyers care about 
the environmental integrity of the asset and in the absence of a regulatory 
authority to guarantee such quality, we would expect to see information 
intermediaries such as standards organizations stepping in to provide 
labeling, certification, and other services to provide some assurances to the 
buyers that the asset meets certain quality requirements. This appears to be 
happening, as evidenced by the proliferation of voluntary offset standards.77 
In the compliance markets, on the other hand, those purchasing credits 
should be indifferent to the actual quality of the credits, so long as they 
satisfy the regulators. Voluntary differentiation or greening, in other words, 
is something we expect to see in the voluntary carbon markets but not in the 
compliance markets. 
In fact, however, we are seeing examples of voluntary greening in the 
Kyoto markets for AAUs and CERs, likely as a response to some of the 
environmental integrity concerns discussed above.78 This is a curious 
development. As suggested, from a rational economic actor perspective, one 
would expect that the buyers in a compliance market, whoever they may be, 
would be interested only in buying compliance. Once the credits are issued 
by the relevant regulatory authority, the question of their underlying 
environmental integrity or quality should not matter to the buyer, whose 
only aim should be to acquire enough credits to satisfy compliance 
obligations. There is no need for a premium currency, in other words, 
because the only characteristic of the asset that matters in these markets is 
whether the unit in question counts toward compliance. But in both the AAU 
market and the CER market, we are seeing efforts to “green” the compliance 
units through voluntary programs and labeling schemes that seek to assure 
buyers of the underlying environmental integrity of the credits.  
A. Green AAUs 
Greening is happening in the AAU market through the so-called Green 
Investment Schemes (GIS) mentioned in the Introduction. These GIS 
programs are self-imposed commitments on the part of certain central and 
eastern European countries (former “economies in transition”), selling 
excess AAUs to use the income generated from such sales for specific 
 
 76 See Fetter, supra note 16, at 480. 
 77 See ANJA KOLLMUSS ET AL., supra note 27, at 141–205 (reviewing different voluntary 
offset standards).  
 78 See supra Part III. 
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activities that will reduce emissions.79 Through such schemes, purchased 
AAUs become linked to specific GHG reduction efforts, providing a means 
of squeezing some of the hot air out of the system.80 
Two types of GIS schemes seem to be emerging. “Hard Greening” refers 
to funded activities that can deliver measurable and quantifiable emission 
reduction units.81 This looks a lot like JI (though without the formal 
certification processes) and includes equipment upgrades, energy efficient 
investments, etc. Ideally, the ratio of GHG emission reductions from hard 
greening to emission reduction credits transferred approximates 1:1. “Soft 
greening” refers to activities that have nonquantifiable and nonmeasurable 
emission reductions, such as capacity building or awareness raising.82 While 
hard to quantify, the ratio of GHG emission reductions from soft greening 
GIS to emission reduction credits would likely be less than 1:1. 
The AAU market is nascent and still developing. In 2009, the total value 
of AAU deals was around two billion dollars, with a volume of one hundred 
fifty-five million tons—a seven-fold increase over the prior year.83 These 
were typically large, bilateral deals, most of which were subject to some 
type of greening.84 Buyers include a few European governments (primarily 
Spain and Belgium), the government of Japan, and large Japanese 
companies.85 To date, Ukraine and the Czech Republic have been the largest 
sellers of green AAUs.86  
The key point is that GIS is not mandated by the Kyoto Protocol, and is 
not something one would expect in a compliance market. This is an entirely 
voluntary creation with no accepted international rules or standards for 
what should or should not count as an acceptable GIS.87 The very flexibility 
of GIS also creates uncertainty because the environmental integrity of 
projects will be harder to assure without robust international legal and 
institutional monitoring, reporting, and verification frameworks designated 
for this purpose.88 
 
 79 See BLYTH & BARON, supra note 6, at 7; KOKORIN, supra note 6, at 2–4, 7–8. 
 80 See KOKORIN, supra note 6, at 4. 
 81 Tuerk et al., supra note 5, at 3 (citing BLYTH & BARON, supra note 6); KARAN CAPOOR & 
PHILIPPE AMBROSI, WORLD BANK, STATE AND TRENDS OF THE CARBON MARKET 2009 at 56, 
available  at  http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTCARBONFINANCE/Resources/State_and_ 
Trends_of_the_Carbon_Market_2009-FINALb.pdf. 
 82 Andreas Tuerk et al., supra note 5, at 3 (citing BLYTH & BARON, supra note 6); CAPOOR & 
AMBROSI, supra note 81 at 56. 
 83 CAPOOR & AMBROSI, supra note 81, at 56. 
 84 See id. at 56. Most deals were reportedly signed at a price of €10 per ton. Id. 
 85 Id. at 24, 54–56. Japanese companies are allowed to use AAUs to comply with Japan’s 
voluntary domestic GHG reduction targets. 
 86 Id. at 56. 
 87 AAU purchase agreements appear to be customized, bilateral deals, which are not 
publicly available. 
 88 See, e.g., Szabo, supra note 1 (quoting Lajos Olah, State Secretary for Hungary’s Ministry 
of Environment and Water, as saying, “The spending of the proceeds will be audited, in this way 
the buyers can check how their money is spent.”). Since Olah made this statement, however, 
Hungary has been the target of criticism for failing to spend the proceeds of its AAU sales on 
environmental initiatives under its GIS framework. Green Gas, “Green Investment Schemes” 
Grow. But Are They Green? MONTHLY CARBON REPORT (Aug. 2009), available 
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B. The CDM Gold Standard 
In the CDM market, several voluntary standards have emerged in an 
effort to differentiate “premium” CERs from the rest of the market.89 The 
most prominent of these is the Gold Standard, which was established under 
the leadership of the World Wildlife Fund for the purpose of certifying high 
quality carbon offsets with demonstrated sustainability co-benefits in both 
the voluntary and compliance markets.90  
The Gold Standard applies to a narrow range of projects in the 
renewable energy and energy efficiency fields on the theory that these sorts 
of projects are far more important than other types of offset projects (e.g., 
industrial gas destruction projects) in encouraging the transition to a low-
carbon energy system.91 The Gold Standard has a specific set of rules 
regarding special additionality tests, sustainability assessments, and public 
consultations, and a separate registry that records and tracks the specific 
CERs that are issued to Gold Standard certified CDM projects.92 
In 2007, the first CERs were issued by the CDM Executive Board for a 
Gold Standard certified CDM project.93 Since that time, around 350,000 Gold 
Standard CERs have been issued for some 20 projects, with additional 
 
at http://greengas.net/files/Carbon%20Report%20Aug%202009(1).pdf. As a result, several pending 
deals for Hungarian AAUs collapsed. See, Marton Kruppa, Hungary Loses €500m After GIS 
Fiddle, POINT CARBON, Nov. 20, 2009, available at http://www.pointcarbon.com/news/ 
1.1298726 (reporting on collapsed AAU deals after report document Hungary’s use of AAU sales 
proceeds to deal with budgetary shortfalls). 
 89 See, e.g., CLIMATE, CMTY. & BIODIVERSITY ALLIANCE, CLIMATE, COMMUNITY AND BIODIVERSITY 
PROJECT DESIGN STANDARDS 6–7 (2d ed. 2008), available at http://www.climate-standards.org/ 
standards/pdf/ccb_standards_second_edition_december_2008.pdf; The Gold Standard, Gold 
Standard FAQs: Certification and Marketing of Gold Standard Carbon Credits, 
http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/Gold-Standard-FAQs.194.0.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2011); 
see also Adrian Muller, Risk Management in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) – The 
Potential of Sustainability Labels, in ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT OF CLIMATE CHANGE: RISKS, 
MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION 193, 201–02 (Bernd Hansjürgens & Ralf Antes eds., 2008); Patrick 
Nussbaumer, On the Contribution of Labeled Certified Emission Reductions to Sustainable 
Development: A Multi-Criteria Evaluation of CDM Projects, 37 ENERGY POLICY 91, 92 (2009). 
 90 The Gold Standard CDM standard was launched in 2003. See THE GOLD STANDARD, GOLD 
STANDARD: THE BENCHMARK FOR QUALITY IN CARBON MARKETS (2009), available at 
http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/fileadmin/editors/files/1_communication/flyer/Gold_Standard
_flyer_2009.pdf. A Gold Standard for the voluntary markets was issued in 2006. Id. 
 91 Press Release, Gold Standard Foundation, supra note 8, at 1; see also Levin et al., supra 
note 8, at 784. 
 92 THE GOLD STANDARD FOUNDATION, GOLD STANDARD REQUIREMENTS VERSION 2.1, at 
12, 38, 39, 44 (2009), available at http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/fileadmin/editors/files/6_GS_ 
technical_docs/GSv2.1/GSv2.1_Requirements.pdf; see also Muller, supra note 89, at 202.  
 93 See Muller, supra note 89, at 202. 
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projects in the pipeline.94 These Gold Standard CERs apparently trade at up 
to a 25% premium over “regular” CERs.95 
It is not entirely clear who is buying Gold Standard CERs, and some 
portion of these are clearly being used in the voluntary markets to satisfy 
corporate social responsibility pledges and other ethical investments.96 At 
the same time, some entities regulated under the EU ETS have tendered 
Gold Standard CERs for compliance purposes,97 and a number of 
Governments have also purchased them.98 The Gold Standard organization 
states that Gold Standard-certified credits  
are in high demand due to the growing awareness about the need for rigor and 
transparency in the carbon markets. They are preferred by a range of 
government and private actors and fetch premium prices. Gold standard credits 
have value in any policy environment, so companies feel safe with them 
because they know their carbon investment will have value even if the policy 
environment changes.99  
This suggests that Gold Standard CERs are being used at least in part as a 
hedge against the fragmentation and uncertainty in the carbon markets. 
As with green AAUs, however, there is no regulatory requirement 
under Kyoto or any other compliance scheme that a covered entity, 
 
 94 Id. at 202. The Gold Standard maintains public registries that track Gold Standard 
projects and certified credits for such projects. The registry listing Gold Standard CDM and JI 
projects is available at https://gs1.apx.com/myModule/rpt/myrpt.asp?r=113. The registry 
tracking certified Gold Standard CERs and ERUs is available at https://gs1.apx.com/myModule/ 
rpt/myrpt.asp?r=114.  
 95 The Gold Standard, Gold Standard FAQs, http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/Gold-
Standard-FAQs.194.0.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2011) (click on “Gold Standard FAQs” and then 
click on “Certification and Marketing of GS Carbon Credits”). 
 96 See Eva Wuchold, Senior Project Manager, First Climate, Remarks at the Gold Standard 
Third Annual Academy in Istanbul (Feb. 23, 2010) (presentation slides available at 
http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/fileadmin/editors/files/1_communication/academy/Academy_ 
2010_Presentations/Academy230210_EXTERNAL_EW-Stimulating_Demand_In_An_Evolving_ 
Carbon_Market_Scenario.pdf); see also KATHERINE HAMILTON ET AL., FORTIFYING THE 
FOUNDATION: STATE OF THE VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKETS 2009 at 94–95, available at http://www. 
ecosystemmarketplace.com/documents/cms_documents/StateOfTheVoluntaryCarbonMarkets_ 
2009.pdf. 
 97 See, e.g., Hauke Hermann et al., FREE ALLOCATION OF EMISSIONS ALLOWANCES AND CDM/JI 
CREDITS WITHIN THE EU ETS: ANALYSIS OF SELECTED INDUSTRIES AND COMPANIES IN GERMANY 28 
(2010) (discussing surrender of Gold Standard CERs by German companies to meet EU ETS 
compliance obligations).  
 98 See HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 96, at 92–93. Additional research is needed on the 
identities and motivations of buyers of Gold Standard CERs. At least some portion of the Gold 
Standard CERs that have been issued to date have been surrendered for compliance purposes 
by covered entities under the EU ETS. See Mauro Fadda, Local Expert Central & South 
America, The Gold Standard Foundation, Remarks at the Latin American Carbon Forum 2009 in 
Panama City, Panama (June 2009) (presentation slides available at http://www.latincarbon.com/ 
2009/docs/presentations/VoluntaryMarket&VERStandards_Fadda.pdf); see also ROB ELSWORTH, 
HYDRO CERS AND THE EU ETS 2009 4 (2010), available at http://www.sandbag.org.uk/site_media/ 
pdfs/reports/Hydro_CERs_and_EU_ETS.pdf. 
 99 The Gold Standard, Gold Standard FAQs, http://cdmgoldstandard.org/Gold-Standard-
Faqs.194.0.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2011). 
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whether a country under Kyoto or a private company under the EU ETS, 
use premium CERs for compliance purposes. Taken together, these 
examples of green differentiation in the compliance carbon markets are 
unprecedented. They simply do not track the experiences in other 
environmental compliance markets.  
VI. EXPLANATIONS—WHY IS THIS HAPPENING? 
If experience from other environmental compliance markets does not 
predict green differentiation in the compliance carbon markets, then what’s 
going on? While more empirical research is needed to answer this 
question, no one seems to be conducting this research or even asking the 
question. To guide future work in this area, we suggest below a range of 
possible explanations.  
From a purely economic perspective, one might explain this as a simple 
hedging strategy premised on the notion that “green” credits are more likely 
to retain their value in future iterations of the carbon markets and therefore 
warrant a premium today. Given the uncertainty associated with the post-
2012 process and the proliferation of various regional, national, and sub-
national markets, savvy buyers may be willing to pay more for green AAUs 
and Gold Standard CERs today because they are more likely to hold their 
value in the markets of tomorrow. This explanation suggests that the 
identity of the buyers should not matter. In other words, one would expect 
to see both governments and large corporate enterprises with multiple 
potential compliance obligations in future markets active in the purchase of 
green compliance credits. That does not appear to be the case, however, 
given the dominance of governments as buyers of these credits.100 Something 
else must be going on.  
A broader political economy explanation starts from the fact that 
buyers of these green compliance units are primarily governments, and 
views these purchases as responses to demands from important domestic 
political constituencies. From this perspective, the market for green AAUs 
and Gold Standard CERs is largely the result of political pressure brought to 
bear on governments in Europe and Japan by environmental groups.101 By 
paying a premium for higher quality “green” credits, these governments are 
making good on promises not to use hot air for compliance purpose.102 
Among other things, this explanation suggests that one cannot understand 
market dynamics without also understanding the identities and interests of 
the buyers and their relationship to various constituencies. 
 
 100 See supra Part III.A. 
 101 Part of the explanation for the green AAU market may also have to do with the 
monopsonistic structure of the market. Given the large potential supply of AAUs relative to 
demand, and the fact that there are only a small number of buyers, suppliers have little choice 
but to create a new currency to address the specific quality demands of these buyers. This is 
consistent with the underlying political economy explanation. 
 102 See supra text accompanying notes 47–48. 
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A related explanation focuses on fiscal responsibility. Because the 
buyers of these credits are primarily governments, it is appropriate to view 
these purchases through the lens of public procurement. In this explanation, 
the decision to purchase premium green credits is largely a response to 
possible criticism over purchases of hot air. Greened credits provide a 
means of ensuring value and accountability for the expenditure of public 
funds and improving the integrity of the system. Purchasing greened credits 
provides a defense to charges of wasting taxpayer dollars.103 
The final explanation focuses on governments as green consumers. In 
this view, European and Japanese governments are genuinely concerned 
about the environmental integrity of their purchases and the success of the 
Kyoto framework. Buyers of green AAUs and Gold Standard CERs, in other 
words, are truly interested in buying environmental integrity rather than 
simply buying compliance. Because the standard AAU and CDM currencies 
fail to capture adequately the environmental and sustainability co-benefits 
that these Governments committed to under Kyoto, differentiated premium 
green currencies are emerging to satisfy additional demands for quality. The 
small number of major AAU buyers—essentially Japan and Western 
European nations—accentuates this effect. Once they agree not to buy hot 
air, suppliers have no choice but to create a new currency to address this 
narrowed demand. 
Part I noted that Belgium and Spain are not acting like rational 
economic actors in their decisions to purchase green AAUs, but this 
assumes that they actually should behave like rational economic actors. It 
seems more likely that government buyers of Green AAUs (and some buyers 
of Green CERs) are expressly not like buyers in the wetlands mitigation 
banking or domestic emissions allowance markets.104 To be sure, more 
empirical research is needed to fully understand the dynamics of greening in 
the Kyoto markets, but it is clear from this initial survey that the motivations 
behind Government purchasing decisions are important drivers of this 
greening and are not self-evident.  
VII. LESSONS—DOES THIS MATTER?  
The curious case of greening in the carbon markets may be just that—a 
curious case, a temporary one-off development that will eventually give way 
to more expected behavior as these markets grow and as regulatory 
authorities adopt new rules to squeeze some of the hot air out of the system. 
It’s still early days. In a larger sense, however, the greening story matters 
 
 103 This explanation is also consistent with the recent decision by Japan and other potential 
AAU buyers to pull out of large AAU deals with Hungary after it became apparent that the 
Hungarian government had not managed the proceeds from prior AAU sales in accordance with 
its GIS program. Kruppa, supra note 88 (reporting on collapsed AAU deals after report 
documenting Hungary’s use of AAU sales proceeds to deal with budgetary shortfalls). 
 104 One possible problem with this explanation, of course, is that the best way for these 
governments to demonstrate environmental integrity is to make real reductions at home rather 
than buy greened credits. 
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because it highlights the importance of understanding the identity of the 
buyers, their motivations, and the nature of the asset in the context of 
emerging compliance markets. In the Kyoto markets, the identity of the 
buyers is critical. Governments are the main buyers of green compliance 
credits and are not acting like their private sector counterparts. While 
environmental integrity does not typically matter in terms of compliance, it 
matters greatly to domestic political constituencies. As a result, the standard 
economic explanation of market behavior needs to be supplanted with a 
political economy explanation.  
This story also shows the importance of understanding the nature of the 
asset and its ability (or lack thereof) to hold value. The global compliance 
carbon markets are fraught with uncertainty and highly fragmented. Because 
the future trajectory of the compliance markets remains unclear, the value 
of AAUs and CERs in a future post-2012 market, not to mention those 
emerging in other jurisdictions such as the United States, is not clear. 
Greening thus provides a possible hedge against such uncertainty—a way of 
ensuring that credits purchased today will hold their value in the future 
under any policy environment, as the Gold Standard claims for its credits. 
This suggests a dynamic process of market evolution. The structure and 
rules of future markets may well be shaped by the lobbying of parties with 
large holdings of greened credits, seeking to influence the political and 
administrative processes and ensure their credits retain their value. 
Greening also makes sense in a world of fragmented climate 
governance marked by a series of loosely linked domestic and regional 
compliance markets. Any attempt to generate fungible instruments that 
can be accepted in multiple compliance systems will face significant 
information demands. In the absence of a single regulatory authority to 
impose uniform quality standards, and in the face of multiple credit issuing 
bodies, voluntary qualification schemes such as GIS and the Gold Standard 
could play an important role in providing the additional information 
necessary for buyers to navigate this increasingly fragmented world. 
Credible third-party certifiers assure market participants of the quality and 
pedigree of the underlying asset.  
As a result of these greening pressures, the Kyoto carbon markets have 
not operated in accordance with Gresham’s Law. If anything, the reverse 
appears to be happening, as premium green currencies are emerging 
alongside and, in some instances, driving out cheaper, standard currencies—
something that has never happened in other regulatory environmental 
markets. This green differentiation is also fostering new opportunities in 
emerging carbon markets. Thus, ongoing discussion regarding reform of the 
CDM in the post-2012 period is focusing on many of the same concerns that 
motivated the Gold Standard; namely, the need to incorporate sustainability 
co-benefits into the program.105 The European Union’s recent decision to ban 
CERs from industrial gas projects in Phase III of the EU ETS (2013–2020) 
 
 105 Mohamed T. El-Ashry, An Overview of This Issue: Framework for a Post-Kyoto Climate 
Change Agreement, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, Winter 2008, at 2, 3; see also supra text 
accompanying notes 90–91. 
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can be seen as a recognition of the value of green differentiation based on 
Gold Standard type quality criteria, a development that builds upon and 
reinforces green differentiation dynamics in the CER market.106 Similarly, 
general proposals for sector-based offset programs in the design of 
California and U.S. compliance systems and the recent initiative by the 
Government of Japan to develop its own bilateral offset program also 
appear to be incorporating greening strategies developed under GIS efforts 
and the Gold Standard.107  
These developments suggest an interesting thought experiment. The 
greening stories we have described came on the back end, after the market 
rules had been created. Consider, instead, what would happen if the 
compliance markets expressly incorporated from the outset different 
currencies (dark green, light green, brown) that sought to capture different 
levels of quality regarding environmental and sustainability performance?108 
In other words, is there a way to design green differentiation into the 
compliance markets from the outset in a manner that would facilitate a “race 
to the top”—a flight to quality from the start? Much of this would depend, as 
our analysis suggests, on the identity of the buyers and the role of civil 
society in leveraging existing mechanisms for transparency and 
accountability to push for high quality credits. Perhaps it would all collapse 
as a result of too much complexity.109 But it seems to be happening on its 
 
 106 See EU Bans Industrial Offsets from 1 May 2013, POINTCARBON NEWS, Jan. 21, 2011, at 1 
(discussing decision by EU climate change committee supporting European Commission 
proposal to ban CERs generated from HFC-23 and adipic acid N2O projects); “Green” CERs 
Valued at 90-Cent Premium, POINTCARBON NEWS, Jan. 24, 2011, at 1–3 (discussing green 
differentiation in the CER market in response to EU decision to ban HFC-23 credits including 
the launch of new green CER contracts for the post-2012 EU ETS). In the European Parliament 
debates regarding revisions to the post-2012 EU ETS, one of the committee proposals would 
have permitted only “Gold Standard type” CERs and ERUs in the post-2012 phase. See Draft 
Report on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending 
Directive 2003/87/EC so as to Improve and Extend Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance 
Trading System of the Community, 26–27, 34 (Nov. 6, 2008). 
 107 See CAL. AIR RES. BD., PROPOSED REGULATION TO IMPLEMENT THE CALIFORNIA CAP-AND-
TRADE PROGRAM, Appendix A: Proposed Regulation Order §§ 95991–95994 (Oct. 28, 2010) 
(establishing requirements for sector-based offset credits); CAL. AIR RES. BD., PROPOSED 
REGULATION TO IMPLEMENT THE CALIFORNIA CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM, Part I Vol. I, Staff Report: 
Initial Statement of Reasons II-48, III-22 to III-29 (Oct. 28, 2010) (elaborating on sector-based 
offset program); Japan Adopts 15 “Bilateral Offset Mechanism Projects,” JAPAN TODAY, 
Aug. 11, 2010, http://www.japantoday.com/category/technology/view/japan-adopts-15-bilateral-
offset-mechanism-projects. 
 108 This is already happening to some extent in various proposals to develop compliance 
grade credits for Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD). See 
William Boyd, Climate Change, Fragmentation, and the Challenges of Global Environmental 
law: Elements of a Post-Copenhagen Assemblage, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 457, 546 (2010) (discussing 
efforts to accommodate various social and environmental safeguards in the effort to develop 
compliance-grade REDD assets); BRIAN C. MURRAY, LYDIA P. OLANDER & DONALD P. KANAK, 
NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENVTL. POL’Y SOLUTIONS, FORGING A PATH FOR HIGH-QUALITY COMPLIANCE 
REDD CREDITS 6 (2009), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/about/pifs/symposia/ 
fcfs/2010-fcfs-briefing-materials/murray_olander_kanak.pdf. 
 109 Incorporating additional qualities and cobenefits into the currencies for compliance 
carbon, for example, could prove to be a very challenging task. 
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own. Would it not make more sense to learn from this unexpected 
development and build it into market designs going forward?  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Quality concerns have long been an issue in environmental markets—
from wetlands mitigation banking to carbon. But such concerns have never 
translated into any sort of differentiation among currencies in a compliance 
context, until now. As this Article has demonstrated, green differentiation is 
happening in the Kyoto compliance markets—a phenomenon we have 
characterized as Gresham’s Law in reverse. As with most things in life, a 
combination of various factors likely explains this curious case of greening 
in the Kyoto markets. In our view, the most important factor driving this 
phenomenon is the role of governments as buyers. This suggests that carbon 
markets (and other environmental compliance markets) that place 
governments in the position of buyers will likely not operate in the same 
manner as other regulatory environmental markets. When governments are 
major buyers, there are important factors at play beyond the cost of 
compliance. In these circumstances, we should expect differentiation of 
currencies to satisfy the different motives behind government purchasing 
decisions. At a minimum, finding ways to harness green differentiation in 
future carbon markets merits further research and focus on the design of 
such markets. 
 
